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Abstract 
The adequacy of similarity to prototype as an account of categorization in natural 
concepts was assessed by analyzing the monotonicity of the relation between 
typicality of an item in a category and the probability of a positive categorization 
response using data from McCloskey & Glucksberg (1978).  The analysis revealed a 
strong underlying similarity-based threshold curve, with systematic deviations.  
Further data collection showed that deviations from the curve could be attributed to 
the effects of unfamiliarity and non-categorial associations on typicality judgments, 
as well as differences between the perceptual appearance of an item (which tended to 
boost typicality) and its underlying nature (which tended to boost categorization).  
The results are discussed in terms of the different presuppositions and task constraints 










Keywords:  Categorization, fuzzy, concepts, similarity 
Categorization and typicality 
3 
Similarity-Based Categorization and Fuzziness of Natural Categories 
A critical issue in current theorizing about the psychological representation of natural 
concepts concerns the degree to which similarity can provide an account of our 
conceptual categorization of the world.   Whereas similarity-based models such as 
prototype and exemplar-based models (Rosch, 1975, Nosofsky, 1988) propose that 
conceptual categories are formed as clusters held together by the similarity of their 
instances, others have argued that categorization is based on a more rule-like or 
theory-like semantic representation (Osherson & Smith, 1982; Murphy & Medin,  
1985; Rips, 1989).   
 According to Rosch (1975), objects in the world can be clustered together on a 
number of correlated attributes.  For example, creatures are clearly differentiated from 
inanimate objects and plants in terms of their spontaneous behavior, their internal 
organs and a great many other respects.  Within the class of creatures, there are also 
correlations between attributes.  Possession of one attribute (for example a creature 
that has feathers) tends to correlate within the general class of creatures with the 
possession of other attributes (such as having wings and flying).  According to Rosch, 
this cluster of inter-correlated attributes leads to the formation of prototype concepts 
such as BIRD and FISH within the class of creatures - where the prototype represents 
the idealized category member possessing all of the attributes in the cluster.  
Membership in the prototype concept category of FISH or BIRD is determined by 
judging how similar any instance is to this prototype, where similarity itself is defined 
in terms of the weight and number of the prototype attributes that the instance 
possesses. 1   
 Giving the prototype model a more formal treatment and extending its 
representational power, Hampton (1993, 1995b) proposed that the central notion in 
the model involves an intensional representation (as a set of attributes) characterizing 
the average or idealized category member (that is to say, the prototype is an 
abstraction, and not simply the most typical category member).  The attributes could 
themselves be structured in a frame or schema format.  The representation of a 
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particular prototype concept then involves three essential aspects:  the intensional 
representation, a metric for determining similarity of an instance or a subclass to that 
representation, and a threshold criterion which can be placed on the resulting 
similarity measure in order to generate a binary Yes/No decision about the 
categorization.  (Classifying instances as opposed to subclasses on the basis of 
similarity requires a different treatment - see Hampton, 1995b).  Some may object 
that by increasing the representational power of prototype to include structured 
representations and non-perceptual information one loses the distinctive nature of the 
theory.  On the face of it “similarity to a prototype” appears to imply perceptual 
resemblance.  However a moment’s consideration shows that a model that is limited 
to representing purely perceptual information with no deeper structural, functional or 
abstract attributes is simply a “straw man” as a model for representing most concepts.  
One has simply to point to things which commonly appear to be what they are not 
(such as whales or silk flowers) to dismiss such a model.  Nor is it the case that those 
researching prototype theory have adopted such a restriction.  Rosch and Mervis 
(1975), in their series of experiments on family resemblances, based similarity to 
prototype on attribute overlap, where the attributes were subject-generated verbal 
predicates which ranged over a wide variety of features (see also Hampton, 1979).  
Hampton (1976) had subjects cluster attributes generated by others as true of 
categories on the basis of the type of information involved, and found in addition to 
physical/perceptual characteristics there were clusters corresponding to function, 
location, superordinate categorization and behaviour.  Prototype theory has also been 
applied among other things to abstract concepts (Hampton, 1981), personality traits 
(Cantor & Mischel, 1977; 1979), psychological situations (Cantor, Mischel & 
Schwartz, 1982), psychiatric diagnoses (Cantor, Smith, French & Mezzich, 1980), 
and a range of linguistic effects in syntax (Lakoff, 1987), none of which can sensibly 
be considered as perceptually based concepts.  By allowing more powerful 
representational formats, the revised theory also avoids the weaknesses associated 
with simple "feature list" models (Barsalou & Hale, 1993), without losing the 
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essential premise that categorization is based on similarity to a prototype. 
 Hampton (1995a) also pointed out that if the correlation among attributes is 
very high so that (presumably for reasons to do with the nature of the world) there are 
no borderline cases, then it may be possible to give a category “definition” in terms of 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient attributes.  Discovery of natural concepts 
with conjunctive definitions (such as the category of Birds as “feathered bipeds” for 
example) does not therefore invalidate the prototype account.2 
 Along with the development of the prototype theory, Rosch (1975) also 
introduced a new variable - the notion of "typicality".  Typicality of an instance or 
subclass refers to how representative it is of the category or concept.  Typicality 
predicts performance across a range of cognitive tasks (see Hampton, 1993 for a 
review.)  Of central importance to prototype theory is the idea that this variable of 
typicality reflects the same underlying similarity to the category prototype as is used 
in making categorization decisions.  Similarity here is not an empty notion 
(Goodman, 1970) but means "similarity in respect of those attributes which form the 
intensional representation of the prototype concept".  This point is particularly 
important, since similarity can be a  notoriously unconstrained variable, depending on 
the perspective adopted and the respects in terms of which things are judged to be 
similar.  Typicality, then, is a constrained form of similarity, in which the respects 
(and their relative importance) are determined by the conceptual representation itself. 
 It is clear that classifying on the basis of similarity must involve "rules" - there 
must be a rule for determining a similarity value for any pair of concepts (or instance-
concept pair), and there must be a rule for deriving degree of category membership 
(either as a binary outcome via a threshold criterion, or as a fuzzy judgment on a 
response scale) on the basis of this similarity.  In each case, different possible rules 
exist as variants of the prototype model.  However, a stricter notion of "rule-based" 
categorization has been developed as a direct contrast to the similarity-based 
approach. 
 The major alternative to the prototype theory's similarity clustering account of 
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natural concepts was summarized in a seminal paper by Rips (1989).  Reviewing 
arguments from Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman (1983), Goodman (1970), 
Murphy and Medin (1985), Osherson and Smith (1982) and others, Rips made the 
case that membership in natural categories was not primarily dependent on similarity.  
The  argument is that the way in which category membership is determined is 
different from the way in which typicality is derived.   For example, Murphy & 
Medin suggested that whereas typicality in a category may depend largely on 
similarity to a prototype, the membership of some instance or subclass in the category 
depends on whether or not that instance or subclass fits the underlying 
causal/explanatory structure of the category, and it is this underlying "theory" which 
lends coherence to the whole conceptual domain.  Just as a doctor will classify a case 
by considering which known medical condition best accounts for the symptoms 
presented by the patient, so we classify an item in the category that best explains the 
set of attributes that it possesses.  The existence of a causal theory of how observable 
attributes arise from an object's deeper underlying nature allows us to over-ride a 
simple similarity account with a more rule-like or logical classification.  One could 
even say that we see things as being similar because of their category membership, 
rather than categorizing them because of their similarity. 
 One example of where typicality and category membership apparently have 
very different determinations is the case of concepts that have well known explicit 
definitions, such as kinship terms in English (Landau, 1982).  Whether someone is a 
grandmother depends only on whether or not she is female and is the mother of a 
parent (or some logically equivalent definitional rule).  Whether someone is a typical 
grandmother however depends on whether the stereotypical grandmother 
characteristics -- white hair, rocking chair, bakes cookies -- apply.  In this case, 
similarity to the prototype (or more properly the stereotype) does not provide any 
more than probabilistic information about true membership of the category.3    
 Few theorists would wish to argue that kinship terms like uncle or 
grandmother, or other explicitly defined terms such as prime number or triangle are 
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represented by prototype concepts.  Such concepts are perhaps paradigm cases of 
rule-based classification, in the narrow sense of categorization based on a logical 
conjunction of a small set of criterial features.  However to concede this limitation on 
prototype theory is not to abandon the notion that the bulk of our common sense 
everyday concepts, for which explicit definitions are much harder to frame, might not 
still have prototype representations.  Doctors and scientists do indeed have well 
developed theories that allow for a more satisfactory classification of their particular 
domain of expertise according to deeper explanatory principles.  The question 
remains to what extent this model of concepts as elements of theories is appropriate 
for the everyday reasoning of the non-specialist.  Could it be that the model 
overestimates the sophistication of most people's conceptual representations? 
 Evidence on this score concerning common biological and artifact kinds is 
mixed.  Studies on adult's concepts of natural kind and artifact terms by Malt (1990; 
1994; Malt & Johnson, 1992), Hampton (1995a; see also Braisby, Franks & 
Hampton, 1996), and Kalish (1995) suggest that rule-based models of category 
membership often provide a poor account of the way in which people actually 
categorize classes of biological and artifact objects.  For example Malt's research has 
shown that people do not classify liquids as "water" solely on the basis of their 
chemical constituency, but also take into account the origins and human functions of 
the liquid.  Malt also found that categorization in artifact categories was not simply 
based on the intended function of the object, but also reflected less explanatorially 
relevant attributes such as appearance.   
 Hampton (1995a) found that people's categorization in common everyday 
categories was affected by aspects of the concept ("characteristic features") that 
would normatively be expected to be irrelevant.  For example, when told that a fruit 
had been grown from an orange tree, but that because of special growing conditions it 
had the appearance and taste of a lemon, only a third of subjects judged it to be really 
an orange.  Or consider the following description: 
"The offspring of two zebras, this creature was given a special experimental 
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nutritional diet during development.  It now looks and behaves just like a 
horse, with a uniform brown color."   
When asked if this was really a zebra, again only a third of the subjects agreed, the 
rest of the subjects ignoring the genotype in favor of the phenotype, contrary to the 
assumptions of psychological essentialism (Medin & Ortony, 1989;  Rips, 1989).  The 
"rule" for species membership that requires that two creatures will always have an 
offspring of the same type, was overruled for most subjects by the lack of similarity 
of the instance to the class.4 
 Kalish (1995) asked participants to judge whether category membership in a 
class was a matter of fact (as in the case of whether the number 349231 is prime) or a 
matter of opinion (as in the case of whether Florida is a good place to take a 
vacation).5  One could expect that if people feel that categories are based on rules, 
then they would judge their membership to be a matter of fact, even if in individual 
cases the rule was unknown or the application of the rule was hard to determine.  In 
his study, Kalish did not find clear evidence that either biological or artifact 
categories were considered to be rule-based. 
 In the developmental literature, Keil (1989) found that children's 
understanding of concepts may shift from a surface similarity-based concept to a 
deeper "theory-based" concept.  Several other studies in the developmental literature 
have also drawn out the fact that children do not rely on purely perceptual similarity 
to define their concepts (Carey, 1985; Gelman, 1988).  However if similarity is 
defined as above - in terms of the attributes that are relevant to the concept - then 
there is no reason to suppose that children's or adult's prototypes should be represent 
purely perceptual information.  The shift from perceptual to "hidden" aspects of 
objects is evidence of growing levels of knowledge on the part of the child, and an 
increase in the attention and importance accorded to deeper functional and relational 
kinds of attribute in concept representations.  The data do not however show that 
categorization is not still similarity-based.  It is not enough to show a developmental 
trend in the understanding of a concept in order to argue that the format of the 
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representation (as opposed to its content) has actually changed.  This point has 
important implications for many criticisms of the prototype model.  It has often been 
assumed that "similarity" refers only to similarity in visual appearance.  If such were 
the case, similarity-based categorization would of course fail to capture any but the 
most trivial of concepts - those based on obvious visual features.  Prototype theory 
does not make this assumption however.  From the first, Rosch argued that a 
multiplicity of types of feature may be involved in categorization, including common 
function, origin, common ways of interacting with an object, and so forth.  As I 
argued in Hampton (1995a), the central tenet of a similarity-based categorization 
model is that for most concepts people use a wide range of information for judging 
category membership, and this information is combined to form an overall assessment 
of closeness to the category prototype in a way that allows for contextual and 
individual variation in categorization.  "Deeper" aspects of the nature of an object 
(such as the innards, or the parentage of a biological kind) are clearly valid sources of 
information which can be used in categorization, and will be accorded weight in the 
computation of similarity depending on the individual's understanding of the 
conceptual domain, and the contextual purposes of the categorization.   
 If similarity is to be given more than a "straw-man" status in categorization, 
then how might one otherwise differentiate similarity and rule-based categorization?  
One critical piece of evidence concerns the relation between typicality and category 
membership.  If categorization depends on similarity, then there should be a 
monotonic relation between measures of similarity to the prototype (which ratings of 
typicality are assumed to provide), and measures of category membership.  It should 
not be possible to find cases where object A is more typical of a concept than object 
B, but yet object B is more likely to be in the concept category than object A.  
Accordingly Rips (1989) aimed to demonstrate cases where this monotonicity is 
violated, from which it could be argued that categorization could not be based on 
similarity - or at least not on the same kind of similarity as is reflected in judgments 
of typicality to prototype.  
Categorization and typicality 
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Rips' studies 
 In one study Rips asked subjects to consider a range of objects that were each  
half way between two conceptual categories - one a "fixed" category, and the other a 
"variable" category.  To use an illustrative example, coins tend to have a fixed 
diameter (more or less), whereas pizzas can vary in size considerably.  Rips therefore 
asked participants to think of a circular object that had a diameter half way between 
the largest example of an American quarter they could think of and the smallest 
example of a pizza they could think of.  One group of participants were then asked to 
decide whether the object was a pizza as opposed to a quarter (presumably they chose 
whichever option they considered more probable, given that no other information was 
available).  Others judged for which category the object was more typical, and a third 
group judged to which category the object was more similar.  While the object was 
more often judged to be a pizza (overall, 63% chose the variable category), it was 
more likely to have been judged as similar to the quarter (69% chose the fixed 
category), and was about equally likely to be judged as typical of either category 
(54% chose the fixed category).  Hence there was a non-monotonicity of the kind 
required to disprove the prototype account.  The object in question was more similar 
to category A than to category B, but was more likely to belong in B than in A. 
 Notwithstanding some problems with the generalizability of this result (Smith 
and Sloman, 1994, found that unless subjects were "thinking aloud" as they did the 
categorization task, the dissociation did not occur), even as it stands it provides poor 
evidence against similarity-based categorization.  First, the argument is only valid if 
one assumes equal generalization gradients for each concept.  But there is no reason 
to restrict prototype concepts in this way.  According to the model, categorization 
depends on placing a threshold on the similarity measure (Hampton 1993; 1995b; 
1997).  Differences in the placement of the threshold could explain differences in the 
allowed range of variability of concepts.  Rips' fixed categories could have high 
thresholds, whereas his variable categories could have low thresholds -- for example 
the similarity to prototype needed for something to count as a quarter could be much 
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greater than the similarity to prototype needed for something to count as a pizza.6  
Furthermore, where to place the similarity threshold of concepts relative to their 
internal variability is something that can be learned from experience with exemplars 
(Fried and Holyoak, 1984), so there is no need for a rule-based "theory" to explain the 
difference between fixed and variable conceptual classes.   (Lamberts, 1995, offers a 
similar account using a mathematical model of similarity).  Hampton (1995b) argued 
that what in fact differentiates the prototype representation of a class from the 
representation of an individual is just this inclusion of the range of variability allowed 
on different semantic dimensions.  An individual apple has just one color and just one 
size, whereas the class of apples has a distribution of values for color and size. 
 In a second ingenious study, Rips (1989) presented participants with a story in 
which a creature metamorphosed from a bird-like form into an insect-like form.  
When the transformation was caused by hazardous chemicals, then the object was 
judged overall to be more similar to (and typical of) an insect, but more likely to be a 
bird.  By contrast, if the transformation was portrayed as a normal part of the life 
cycle of the creature, then the immature form (before transformation) was judged 
more similar to (and typical of) a bird, but more likely to be an insect. 
 Different generalization gradients could not explain these results since merely 
changing the source of the transformation (accidental versus maturational) changes 
the category to which the object is considered most likely to belong.  Rips' 
demonstration  is a prima facie example of non-monotonicity between similarity and 
categorization.  This second study can also be criticized in several ways7 - for 
example each subject responded to the scenarios for one condition only, yet all three 
responses were collected at the same time from each subject, leading to the possibility 
of demand characteristics (would a subject feel happy to always give the same 
response to all three questions?)   The accidental transformation condition did not 
allow participants to express the anti-essentialist belief that the creature changed 
category as a result of the accident, since they were only asked for a single 
classification of the creature -- "the one that changed".  There was also poor 
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agreement amongst the subjects in the classification of the creatures, and while 
categorization was expressed as a "likelihood" (suggesting relevant information was 
missing), typicality and similarity were judged directly (implying that all relevant 
information was given).  Pending a replication of the study, it does however appear 
that counterfactual examples of this kind may break the normal relation between 
typicality/similarity and categorization (see Hampton, Note 1, for further evidence 
based on a study by Kalish, 1995). 
 A third set of studies by Rips and Collins (1993) employed categories with 
bimodal distributions to demonstrate non-monotonicity.  If a population of people 
was composed of (for example) 5th graders and their fathers, then the height of 
individuals in the set would have two modal values, one for a typical child and one 
for a typical father.  In this situation participants were willing to rate similarity and 
typicality by distance from the mean, but to rate likelihood of being in the population 
on the basis of actual frequency of the value.  Thus someone with the mean height 
would be more typical of the class but judged less likely to belong in it than someone 
else whose height was one of the two modal values.  Similar results were obtained 
with a range of different distributions other than bimodal mixtures of this kind.   
 These last studies also provide clear prima facie examples of non-
monotonicity between similarity and classification.  They achieve this by providing 
very explicit distributional information (participants were shown graphs of the 
distributions of values across the population of instances) which invoked extensional 
reasoning processes in judging likelihood of category membership.  People are thus 
apparently able to use extensional reasoning to make judgments of likelihood of 
category membership, although they still prefer to use distance from the average 
value when judging similarity or typicality.8  Others have stressed the important 
differences between extensional and similarity-based reasoning.  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983) showed that people often engage in similarity-based reasoning 
("representativeness" was the term they used) when they should be thinking 
extensionally -- in particular when estimating the likelihood of membership in a 
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conjunction of two categories compared with likelihood of membership in just one.  
When frequencies are emphasized in the presentation of these problems however, 
people are apparently able to reason extensionally, and their responses are more in 
line with the axioms of subjective probability theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996, 
but see Gigerenzer, 1994, 1996 for an alternative interpretation).  Similar effects 
could have occurred in the Rips and Collins studies.  The "intuitive" reasoning that 
judges typicality or similarity as distance from the average exemplar could be 
replaced with a frequency-based assessment of subjective likelihood when doing the 
categorization task.  Note that in all three of Rips' demonstrations -- the fixed/variable 
categories, the metamorphosis study, and the bimodal distribution experiments -- 
participants are not actually categorizing an instance about which everything is 
known.  They are always asked to assess, on the basis of the available evidence, the 
likelihood that the object is in one category or another.  The evidence offered is 
usually very limited.  This way of framing the categorization task is very different 
from the standard categorization question -- "is an X an instance of category Y?", 
where the task is not framed in a way that presumes that the participant is making a 
judgment with an associated probability of being true or false (cf. Kalish, 1995). 
 The problem with many of these demonstrations is that the reasoning 
processes elicited from the participants may be quite specific to the unusual kinds of 
materials presented.  For example there are a few familiar cases of biological 
metamorphoses (caterpillars to butterflies, tadpoles to frogs), but most of our 
conceptual categories are remarkably stable and most objects fall clearly into one 
class or another.  The issue of whether categorization of the familiar everyday world 
is based on some form of similarity is not therefore always well addressed by these 
studies.  The remainder of this paper therefore turns to the question of whether non-
monotonicity can be observed in data of a more traditional kind -- namely the 
situation where participants decide whether a particular subclass falls in a more 
general category. 
 None of the studies so far described have adopted the most direct way to test 
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the monotonicity between similarity and category membership.  This would be to 
obtain measures of category membership and typicality from independent groups of 
participants and to test the monotonicity of the results directly.  Such an experiment 
would be simple to set up, and in fact McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) published 
data for just this design.  In the Appendix to their paper they listed 492 items in 18 
categories, together with (a) their mean rated typicality, (b) the probability that they 
were categorized positively, and (c) the degree of within subject disagreement.  
(These 492 items were selected from an original total of 540 items by excluding those 
which were considered by any one of 10 participants as referring to overlapping 
rather than nested categories.)   Using these three sources of information, the aim of 
the following analysis is to see to what extent the prototype model can provide an 
adequate account of the data.  The strategy will be first to determine how well 
typicality predicts the likelihood that someone will categorize an item in a category.  
This initial model will then be taken as a base-line from which to identify cases where 
non-monotonicity is occurring - that is to say items which are either more likely or 
less likely to be categorized in a category than would be predicted from their 
typicality.  A study will then be described in which ratings were collected to test 
possible accounts of these deviations from a straightforward similarity-based model 
of categorization. 
Analysis 
The 492 items in 18 categories together with their published normative measures 
were entered for analysis into SPSS for Windows with variables of mean rated 
typicality, and probability of a Yes categorization9  (a fuller account of the statistical 
analysis, including an analysis of the within-subject inconsistency data is to be found 
in Hampton, Note 2).  One category (Carpenter's Tool) was omitted since there were 
only 10 items left in the norms after the rejection of overlapping concepts, 
presumably because most carpenter's tools are also used in other skilled trades.  There 
remained 17 categories with 482 items, with between 24 and 30 items per category.  
If there is a monotonic relation between categorization probability and mean rated 
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typicality, then a plot of one variable against the other should show a monotonically 
rising curve, asymptoting at a probability of one at the top of the typicality scale, and 
at a probability of zero at the bottom of the typicality scale.  More specifically the 
curve should follow a threshold function.  A scatterplot with categorization 
probability as the vertical axis and mean typicality as the horizontal axis (see Figure 
1) revealed the expected threshold curve, but with a considerable spread of items 
above and below the curve.  The overall linear correlation between the variables was 
0.89.  Of course a reasonable level of correlation was to be expected under any 
model.  A more detailed analysis was therefore carried out. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Inter category differences in threshold   
 Scatterplots were produced for each category individually, and representative 
examples of the range of results are shown in the Appendix.  The graphs show that 
some categories (e.g. Bird, Sport) show a neat monotonically rising threshold 
function relating categorization probability to typicality, whereas others (e.g. Disease, 
Fish) do not.  For Fish, for example, items with typicalities in the range from 5 to 6 
showed categorization probabilities ranging from .2 to .9.    
 It was also very noticeable that different categories had different 50% 
categorization threshold points on the typicality scale.  This difference was probably 
owing to scaling factors resulting from the different proportions of members and non-
members in each category list.  In fact across categories, threshold point correlated at 
.55 with mean number of positive categorizations.  These differences in threshold 
point could also have been exacerbated by the use of a blocked presentation of items 
in each category for the typicality ratings, but a randomized presentation of item-
category pairs for the membership decisions.  Range effects were therefore more 
likely to have occurred in the typicality judgments than in the categorization 
responses. 
 In order to remove between-category range effects from the typicality scales, a 
correction constant was subtracted from the typicality scores for each category so that 
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mean typicality for each category was a linear function of mean normalized 
categorization probability.  Effectively this removes between category effects using a 
single parameter to estimate the correction factor based on the average proportion of 
items in each category list that were considered category members.  (Statistical details 
may be found in Hampton, Note 2).  The new typicality variable incorporating the 
subtracted constant is referred to as corrected typicality.  Combining the data from all 
categories once more, the corrected typicality scales correlated with categorization 
probability P at 0.905, and with normalized categorization probability zp at 0.927 (zp 
is a transformation of P which would show a straight line function with typicality if 
the threshold curve followed the cumulative normal distribution function).  A 
regression model was calculated to predict zp from corrected typicality.  The 
regression equation was 
 zp'  = -2.91 + 0.57 X (Corrected Typicality)  (1) 
 Using this equation, predicted values of zp were found, and retransformed 
back into predicted probabilities of categorization using the inverse of the previous 
normalization function.  The observed and predicted P also correlated at 0.927.  Thus 
using a single parameter to estimate the range effect on typicality and assuming a 
normally distributed criterion placement, some 86% of the variance in categorization 
probability could be predicted on the basis of mean rated typicality alone.  An 
alternative analysis was run which calculated individual correction factors for each 
category separately and achieved a correlation of .947.   
 Part of the successful fit of the regression model is owing to the inclusion in 
the lists of words of items which were clearly not members of their categories - for 
example Car as an Animal or Bee as a Bird.  It was important to keep these items in 
the statistical analysis, in order to anchor the threshold function at the bottom end, 
and to enable calculation of the range effect, but at the same time the ability to predict 
low typicality and low categorization probability for such items is not too surprising.  
To examine the effect of these items on the fit of the model, a subset of data were 
selected by eliminating any items with categorization probability less than .05 
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(allowing for occasional lapses in concentration on the part of the participants).  The 
correlation of observed and predicted categorization probability fell to .903, based on 
444 of the original 482 words.  The model is clearly still a reasonable fit to the data.  
Finally, a similar argument could be made concerning items that are very clearly 
category members, which may be exerting strong leverage on the regression equation.  
Accordingly the 324 items which had categorization probabilities between .05 and .95 
were selected.  These items constitute the borderline region of fuzzy categorization 
where the test of monotonicity is most critical.  The correlation for these items 
between predicted and observed categorization probability was still high at .850. 10 
Across the individual categories, taking just the borderline region of items, typicality 
correlated with normalized categorization probability with values between .68 (for 
Fish and Animal) and .98 (for Bird) with an estimated mean of .87.  The range of 
correlations across categories was not consistent with the hypothesis that they were 
from a homogenous population (chi square(16) = 33.4, p < .01).  There were therefore 
significant inter-category differences in how well typicality correlated with zp, but 
these differences did not reflect any obvious semantic distinction. 
 The purpose of the analysis was first to identify how well typicality alone 
could predict normalized categorization probability.  The second purpose was to use 
the typicality model as a base-line in order to identify cases where typicality is not a 
good predictor of categorization, such as those seen in the Disease and Fish categories 
in the Appendix.  It is these cases that break the expected pattern of a monotonic 
increase in categorization probability with typicality which are of particular interest 
from the point of view of similarity-based accounts of categorization.  To identify 
such cases as accurately as possible, typicality was corrected individually for each 
category, so that each category had a 50% threshold point corresponding to 5 on the 
typicality scale.  A scatterplot of the observed and predicted values of P based on this 
corrected typicality was plotted (see Figure 2) and the residuals examined.   
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The distribution of residuals showed significant positive kurtosis, suggesting that 
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there were outlier cases which were not simply reflecting normally distributed 
random error in the measurements.  Cases with absolute standardized residuals 
greater than 2 were examined.  There were 36 such outliers (7.5% of the cases).  
These outliers are shown in Table 1.  They constitute evidence against a single 
similarity dimension underlying both typicality and categorization judgments.  They 
therefore deserved further exploration. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Accounting for residual variance 
 Various hypotheses suggested themselves to explain why items should have 
been categorized with a probability higher or lower than that predicted from their 
typicality.  First, there may have been factors other than similarity affecting the 
typicality ratings.   
 Familiarity is known to play a role in how people rate typicality (Barsalou, 
1985; Hampton & Gardiner, 1983; Malt & Smith 1982; McCloskey, 1980.)  When 
items are unfamiliar they are normally given lower typicality ratings.  However 
unfamiliar items are not necessarily rejected from categories (in fact category 
membership may be all that is known of some unfamiliar animals or diseases).   
Unfamiliar items would be expected therefore to be judged as less typical than would 
be warranted by their category membership.  This effect is possibly seen in Table 1 
for items such as Sea Anemone, Hydra, Euglena, Lamprey, Sinkhole, and Sampan, all 
of which have observed P greater than predicted -- that is they all have depressed 
values of typicality. 
 Superficial similarity could also be playing a role in boosting typicality 
ratings.  For example in the Fish category, all three aquatic mammals were found to 
have  categorization P  lower than expected from their typicality ratings .  Tadpole 
was also in this position (although not extreme enough to be shown in Table 1).  The 
account offered here would be that greater weight is accorded to perceptual similarity 
in typicality judgments than in categorization judgments.  This hypothesis would lend 
support to the notion of a differentiation between the information used in typicality 
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judgements and that employed in categorization, as predicted by the "binary" view of 
concept structure (Osherson & Smith, 1982) and as proposed by Rips (1989), 
although it could also be understood as a shift in the weight given to different aspects 
of a concept in judging similarity for the purpose of categorization, as opposed to 
similarity for the purpose of making a typicality judgment.   
 The converse of this effect is that items with a poor superficial similarity but a 
better match to "technical" definitions should have greater P than predicted on the 
basis of typicality -- Tomato and Olive as Fruits, and Sponge and Yeast as Animals 
might well fall into this category. 
 Membership in contrasting categories could also play a role in reducing 
categorization probability below its predicted level.  There is a bias -- noted 
particularly in the developmental literature -- for people to assume that categories are 
mutually exclusive (Clark, 1973; Pinker, 1984; Slobin, 1973).  In a similarity-based 
categorization scheme, categorization can proceed either in a contrastive way (where 
each item is classed with the category to which it best belongs) or in a non-contrastive 
way (where each item is classed with any category to which it is sufficiently similar, 
and may thus be included in a number of overlapping categories.)  One possible cause 
of items deviating from the threshold function would be that in categorization 
judgments people are more inclined to think contrastively than when making 
typicality judgments.  For example in the Furniture category, the three items Sewing 
Machine, Stove, and Refrigerator may have been thought by many participants to be 
better classified in a contrasting category such as Appliances, and so were rejected as 
Furniture in line with the Mutual Exclusivity heuristic.  When considering typicality 
however, participants may have been driven more by similarity to the category itself, 
and less by consideration of alternative contrasting categories.  There is a 
presupposition in judging typicality that the item in question is actually a category 
member, and so closeness to other category prototypes may have less influence on the 
typicality judgments than on categorization itself.11  (This point is taken up further in 
the General Discussion).  This account might explain the low P value for Bracelet and 
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Cuff-links as Clothing (in that they may be better classed as Jewellery or 
Accessories), and for a number of Ships which might be better categorized as Boats 
(Sailboat, Rowboat and Lifeboat). 
 Finally, non-categorial associations could act to boost typicality without 
affecting categorization.  When a word refers to something that is not logically of the 
right kind (for example a part or product of a fruit, like Orange Juice, a symptom of a 
disease like Fever, a time of characteristic weather like Autumn) then typicality 
ratings may tend to reflect this association, without any corresponding effect on 
categorization probability.  That is, typicality ratings could be influenced by semantic 
associatedness involving other types of semantic relation.  Recent work by Bassok 
and Medin (1997) suggests that similarity itself can also be influenced by thematic 
(co-occurrence) as opposed to categorial (taxonomic) associations.  Included in this 
heading would also come Cocoon and Egg in the Animal category - items strongly 
associated with the lives of animals but probably not considered to be animals in 
themselves. 
Experiment 
 In order to test these post hoc hypotheses, the 17 lists of category items from 
the norms were presented to 20 participants with instructions to rate each word 
according to a number of different criteria.   
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 20 student volunteers at the University of 
Chicago who were paid $6 for their help.   
 Procedure.  There were three main sections to the task: 
 1) Familiarity.  Participants checked one column if the word was unfamiliar, 
and a second column if the thing that the word referred to was unfamiliar.  If they 
checked either column, they moved directly on to the next word. 
 2) Categorization.  Participants categorized each word in the category at the 
head of the list, choosing just one of the following responses A to D, by checking the 
appropriate column (quotes indicate literal quotation from the instructions given):   
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A) Member (OK) -- "if the word is clearly a member of the category, e.g. horse as 
a mammal";  
B) Only technically speaking a member -- "if the word refers to a thing which is 
'only technically speaking' in the category.  In other words it is not like other 
typical category members, yet in a technical sense it does belong in the category.  
An example might be human being as a mammal";   
C) Technically speaking not a member -- "if the word refers to a thing which may 
loosely speaking be called by the category name but is 'technically speaking' not a 
member of the category.  It may be similar to or easily confused with other 
category members, but in a technical sense it does not belong.  An example might 
be a kangaroo as a mammal, if marsupials are not mammals."   
D) Non member -- "if the word is clearly not a member of the category e.g. a 
snake as a mammal."  12 
 3) Other things.  The final two columns required two further judgments.  The 
first was headed Part or Associated Property and had the following rubric: "For some 
words you may feel that the categorization was problematic because the word referred 
to something that was not the right sort of thing - for example it might be a part or a 
property of an object that was in the category (like fur as a mammal), or it might refer 
to some other closely associated notion (like milk or pork as a mammal).  If you feel 
this is the case, then check this column."  The second was headed Other categories 
and had the following rubric: "For some of the words which you judged to be 
members  you may also feel that while the word in question can be considered as a 
category member, it is actually a better example of another category (not necessarily 
one of those in this booklet) with which it is more closely associated.  For example a 
hammer could be considered a Weapon, but it would be more natural to classify it as 
a Tool.  If this is the case then check this column.  (Don't worry about this one if you 
did not class the word as a member)." 
 Participants were asked to read through the list of words on each page first, 
and then to work down the page completing all questions for each word, unless the 
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word or object was unfamiliar in which case they did not need to answer any further 
questions about it.  The task took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
Results 
 The aim of collecting new data was to test the post hoc hypotheses of why 
certain items were poorly fit by the simple similarity-based model predicting 
categorization probability from mean typicality.  To show the distribution of the 
different responses across categories, Table 2 shows (a) the overall number of items 
receiving  at least one "unfamiliar" response either to the word or the object, (b) the 
mean percentage of valid responses per item for each of the four categorization 
judgments, and (c) the mean number of items with at least 10% responses to the 
Associated part or property, and Contrast category questions.  It can be seen that in 
most categories there were items attracting responses in answer to the different 
questions.  On average there were 3 or 4 unfamiliar items per category, with most 
falling in the three categories of Birds, Precious Stones and Ships.  On average, 
around 10% of categorization responses were of the "technical member" kind, and 
another 10% of the "technically not a member" kind.  There was considerable 
variability across categories here, with for example only about 3% technical members 
for Birds and Insects, and as many as 25% technical members for Vehicles.  For the 
last two responses, the part/property response occurred for an average of 4.5 items, 
and the contrast category for an average of 3.6 items per category. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 A regression model predicting categorization probability was developed in the 
following way.  First, categorization probability was normalized as before, so that 
(according to the model) the relation with typicality may be expected to be 
approximately linear.  Normalized categorization probability zp was treated as the 
dependent variable.  Corrected mean typicality was entered into the regression first as 
in the model described previously.  On subsequent steps, each of the following 
variables were then entered individually in a forwards stepwise fashion (entering the 
next best predictor at each step) to assess whether they explained residual variance, 
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not accounted for by typicality alone.  The variables were:  unfamiliarity of the 
word/object (UNFAMILIAR), scored as the number of participants checking either of 
the two unfamiliarity responses; only technically a member (ONLY TECHNICAL); 
technically not a member (TECHNOT); associated part or property (PART/PROP); 
and membership of contrast categories (CONTRAST).  Each of these last four 
variables was coded as the proportion of all participants who were familiar with the 
word and object who then checked the appropriate column.  In order to concentrate on 
the prediction of categorization probability within the region of interest, the analysis 
was run using only the 324 items with categorization probability between .05 and .95. 
 The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 3.  After typicality, 
four variables entered significantly, using a significance criterion of .05.  The table 
shows the statistics for this equation.  Multiple R was .900, corresponding to 81% of 
the variance.   
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Of the various hypothetical accounts of residual variance in categorization 
probability, all but the Contrast category hypothesis were born out in the data.  (The 
Contrast variable still made no significant contribution if forced into the equation 
immediately after Typicality and before the other variables.)  Items with 
categorization probability P higher than expected from typicality tended to be more 
unfamiliar, or to be only technically speaking category members.  Those with lower P 
than expected from typicality tended to be associated parts or properties, or to be 
technically speaking not members of the category.   
 Four of the five new variables were shown to predict significant residual 
variance in categorization probability.  The question remains finally of whether all 
remaining reliable variance has now been captured, or whether there is still some 
variance remaining to be explained.  In order to answer this question, a test is needed 
of the reliability of the residual variance for the final model.  One test of this 
reliability is to compare the residual categorization probability with another measure 
of categorization probability. If the residuals are truly based on random noise then 
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they should not correlate with any other variables.  An independent measure of 
categorization probability was available in the data from the categorization phase of 
the experiment.  By calculating the proportion of participants giving a categorization 
response who responded with either a clear yes or an "only technically speaking yes", 
an estimate of categorization probability was obtained.  This variable was entered into 
the regression equation after all other variables were entered, and explained 
significant additional variance.  The Multiple R rose from .953 to .961 in the full 
analysis, and variance explained (adjusted R2) rose from 90.7% to 92.3%.  In the 
restricted data set of 324 borderline items, R rose from .900 to .915, and adjusted R2  
from 80.8% to 83.4%.  The answer to the question therefore appears to be that not all 
reliable variance has been explained by typicality plus the four new variables. 
 Between category differences.  Another question of particular interest is 
whether deviations from the similarity-based categorization threshold function were 
attributable to different factors depending on the type of semantic category.  The 
regression model used the same coefficients to fit all categories.  Remaining 
systematic variance may then reflect differences among categories.  Biological 
categories, for example, are differentiated by the existence of a technical 
classification scheme based on biological theory, which could influence participants' 
categorization through encouraging essentialist beliefs.  It may therefore be expected 
that the influence of the ONLY TECHNICAL and TECHNICAL NOT variables may 
be stronger in biological categories.  To investigate this possibility, the 17 categories 
were collapsed into five groups.  The first two were clear groupings: four biological 
kinds (fish, insects, birds and animals) and five categories of artifacts (clothing, 
furniture, kitchen utensils, ships and vehicles).  The remaining groups were more 
approximate clusters of: natural kinds (natural earth formation, precious stone, 
weather phenomenon); food (fruit, vegetable); and other categories (sport, science, 
disease).  Within each group, regression analyses were run predicting residual 
categorization probability (after regression on typicality) from the five variables 
collected in the experiment.  Table 4 shows the pattern of significant variables. 
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INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
For biological kinds, UNFAMILIAR, ONLY TECHNICAL and TECHNICAL NOT 
were all significant.  "Technical only" members were more likely to be categorized, 
and technically not members were less likely to be categorized than would be 
expected on the basis of typicality.  This result confirms the idea that there is an 
influence of biological knowledge on people's classification of birds, fish, insects and 
animals.  People were more inclined towards technical definitions when classifying 
than when rating typicality.  The story is not quite so simple however.  When the 
proportion of people giving an ONLY TECHNICAL and a TECHNICAL NOT 
response was correlated across items, it emerged that there was a significant positive 
correlation between the two variables for biological kinds (r(119) = .25, p < .01).  
This correlation was largely owing to the category of Fish where the correlation was 
.59 (df = 28, p < .001).  The significance of this unexpected positive correlation is that 
many items were being labelled both as "only technically" members and also (by 
other participants) as "technically not" members.  Items in the Fish category with this 
pattern of responses were tadpole, shark, lamprey, stingray and seahorse.  These two 
response classes were therefore being used to signal a borderline case, rather than to 
indicate that there was a commonly agreed theoretical basis for classifying the item 
which differed from its similarity-based categorization.  Alternatively it might also 
have indicated that participants felt that there was a different (more technical) basis 
for categorization, but that they lacked sufficient knowledge about either the category 
or the individual items to be able to apply it consistently. 
 For artifacts neither of the technical variables was significant, in spite of 
relatively high rates of use of the two responses (see Table 2).  However for artifacts, 
the CONTRAST CATEGORY variable was significant.  Thus for artifacts but not for 
biological kinds an item might be less likely to be classified in the category if it was 
judged to be a better member of some contrasting set.  This result makes good sense 
given that biological kinds rarely show overlap (other than cases of class inclusion) 
while it is quite common for an object to fall in more than one artifact category.  An 
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object may be at the same time a weapon and a vehicle, or an electrical appliance and 
an item of furniture.   
Discussion 
 In the course of this analysis, I have hypothesised a mathematical relationship 
between typicality and categorization probability -- namely a monotonically 
increasing threshold function based on the cumulative normal distribution.  I have fit 
this function to the data, and sought to account for those data points that did not fit the 
predicted relationship.  While this procedure is clearly post hoc, and so runs the risk 
of "explaining" effects which may reflect random noise in the data, the method is 
appropriate to use as a way of identifying outliers and hence generating interesting 
hypotheses about the conditions in which the relation between typicality and P 
deviates from the monotonic threshold function.  The procedure is particularly 
interesting methodologically since it very clearly reveals the cases that deviate from 
an expected similarity-based categorization function.  
 The underlying trend of a monotonic function is compelling in many of the 
categories, and the outliers are in a majority of cases just those which would be 
expected to be outliers on the basis of reasonable assumptions, supported in the 
literature.  One area where there was clear evidence that categorization involves more 
than typicality was in biological kinds, where items with poor superficial similarity 
and better match of core qualities were more likely to be included in the category than 
expected, while those which had good superficial similarity but poor match of deeper 
aspects were less likely to be categorized positively.  However, even in these 
biological categories categorization was far from clear-cut.  Much has been made in 
the literature (e.g. Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974) about the well-definedness of BIRDS 
for example.  Smith et al. used the clear distinction between birds and non-birds to 
argue for a distinction between defining features, and merely characteristic features.  
However when the data are plotted relating typicality to P for birds (see Appendix), it 
is seen that there is a clear distinction not only in P but also on the horizontal axis of 
Typicality.  The function is quite consistent with the smoothly rising threshold 
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function seen for other categories, indicating that there is no reason to suppose that 
Birds are any different from other similarity-based categories. 
 In contrast to the biological categories, the artifact categories showed no 
evidence for deep/surface information differentiating categorization and typicality.  
Where typicality did not provide a good prediction of categorization, one reason was 
identified as the effect of possible contrast categories.  Many objects can fall in more 
than one category (for example a knife may be a tool, a weapon and a kitchen 
utensil). The data analysis presented here suggests that when making categorization 
judgments people are more inclined to take note of contrasting categories than when 
judging typicality (but see footnote 11).  They may be willing to say that a hammer is 
quite a typical weapon (it has all the properties necessary to function as such), but 
prefer to say it is not in the category, since it is more fittingly categorized as a tool. 
 In conclusion, similarity-based categorization has been shown to provide a 
good base-line model for understanding the structure of natural categories.  Some 
systematic deviations from a monotonic relation between typicality and 
categorization probability were observed, and the best account of these deviations 
appeared to be in terms of (a) unfamiliarity, (b) a greater weight accorded to 
superficial similarity in rating typicality than in categorization, particularly in 
biological kinds (c) a greater account taken of contrasting categories in categorization 
than in typicality rating, particularly in artifact kinds, and (d) an effect of non-
similarity-based associations on typicality ratings but not on categorization.  Given 
that typicality ratings are known to be impure reflections of similarity to a category 
prototype (Barsalou, 1985) the influence of familiarity and other associative effects 
need not be taken to undermine the similarity-based categorization account of the 
structure of these categories.  Likewise the increased emphasis on contrasting 
categories in the categorization task can easily be accommodated within a similarity-
based account.  Given two prototype representations, categorization can be made in a 
contrastive manner (by classifying any item with the category to which it has the 
greatest similarity -- relative to the similarity-membership function for each 
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category), or in a non-contrastive manner (by classifying relative to each category 
independently and allowing the categories to overlap).  Indeed most exemplar models 
(Medin & Schaffer, 1978, Nosofsky, 1988) incorporate a contrastive categorization 
rule, classifying items in the class to which they bear the greatest average similarity. 
 The non-monotonicity which gives best support to the rule-based view offered 
by Rips (1989) is the effect contrasting superficial similarity with more definitional or 
diagnostic features.  For example whales, seals and dolphins were considered more 
typical of Fish than was warranted by their low level of categorization.  Conversely 
tomatoes and olives were judged less typical of Fruit than was warranted by their high 
probability of categorization.  There are a number of ways to interpret this result. One 
could take this as evidence for rule-based classification, showing an effect of deeper 
knowledge based on biological theory.  Alternatively, one could propose that there is 
a shift in the weights used to compute similarity in the two tasks.  Rips (1989) has 
argued that this theoretical move greatly weakens the prototype model, since giving 
up the notion of fixed weights, independently determined, allows the modeller to fit 
any categorization data.  If one takes whatever criteria are in the categorization rule, 
and sets them up as highly weighted attributes in a prototype, then effectively the 
rule- and similarity-based models converge.  Actually, this is not quite true since the 
similarity-based model requires that categories be linearly separable in terms of the 
available features, whereas rules presumably have no structural constraints on what 
can form a category, instead deriving their constraints from the nature of higher level 
theories within which the categories are embedded (Murphy & Medin, 1985).  In fact, 
a demonstration that natural concept categories are commonly not linearly separable 
would be excellent evidence against the similarity view.  Although it has been shown 
that certain non-linearly separable categories are as easy (or difficult) to learn as 
linearly separable ones (Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981), I am aware of no direct 
evidence of this kind. 
 The categorization data shown in the graphs in the Appendix and summarized 
as the vertical axis in Figures 1 and 2 show little evidence of rule-based classification.  
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McCloskey and Glucksberg were correct in concluding from their study that 
membership in these categories is not all-or-none but shows clear signs of 
gradedness, and it is quite unclear how rule-based models can account for that 
gradedness.  At the least an account is required of the source of the observed 
disagreement and inconsistency in classification.  (McCloskey and Glucksberg 
demonstrated that people are not particularly consistent in their classifications across 
a period of a few weeks, so the fuzziness in categorization cannot be just a matter of 
individual differences in people's beliefs about the correct classification rule.) 
Theories and prototypes 
 A reasonable reaction to the view of concept representations presented here is 
to ask how the more powerful version of prototype theory advocated by Hampton 
(1995b) differs from rule-based “theory” theories of concepts of the kind discussed by 
Murphy and Medin (1985) or Rips (1989).  Both are capable of representing 
relational and abstract kinds of information about concepts, and it is not immediately 
clear whether differential predictions can be derived.  One important difference is in 
the emphasis for prototype theory on the abstract representation of the most common 
attributes of the class.  The theory argues that the reason that conceptual borderline 
disputes are so common and so puzzling is that category borderlines themselves are 
not firmly represented in memory.  Changes in perspective and classification context 
may then affect how different attributes are weighted and how broadly or narrowly 
the category should be defined.  Rule-based theories by contrast appear to argue for 
the involvement of inferential reasoning as a part of categorization.  Items are 
categorized with the concept that best generates their observed attributes through 
reasoning processes applied to the concept representation.  Both theories remain 
grossly under specified in terms of processing accounts of exactly how these 
representations are learned, retrieved into working memory, or operated upon.  It is 
perhaps time to consider a compromise model that will both have the representational 
power to represent theory-laden concepts such as natural kinds, but also provide an 
account of the process of categorization that fits with empirical data on the fuzziness 
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of category boundaries and accounts for the influence of typicality on a wide range of 
cognitive tasks. 
A pragmatic account on non-monotonicity 
 One approach which may prove fruitful is to consider the vagueness of the 
categorization task itself in terms of the lack of a clear discourse context offered to 
the categorizer (Braisby & Franks, 1996).  A recent study by Hampton and Dubois 
(1996) tested this notion, but found little or no evidence that clarifying the context 
reduces the fuzziness of categorization.  Participants classified borderline cases either 
under conditions where an elaborate scenario was provided, or in a condition with no 
scenario.  Levels of disagreement and inconsistency were unaffected by the 
manipulation.  Alternatively, it may be that by developing research into the kinds of 
feature that influence typicality as opposed to categorization, similarity can be 
constrained sufficiently to provide a predictively adequate account of categorization.
 If the notion that both typicality and categorization employ a common 
conceptual representation of the category is to be preserved, then the way in which 
attributes are selected and weighted as relevant to the decision must differ between 
the two judgments.  The question is then how this selective weighting might be 
predicted.  Note that this proposal is also consistent with many of the points made by 
Rips in his critique of similarity.  Perhaps the two positions can be integrated if a 
proper understanding can be reached of how a common conceptual representation is 
processed differently in arriving at typicality or categorization judgments.  The 
analysis of factors differentially affecting the two judgments presented earlier goes 
some small way towards this goal. 
 To pursue the question of discourse context a little further, consider how 
participants may construe the meaning of the instructions given in a typicality task.  
When asked to say "how typical is this of the category?" or "how good an example is 
this of the category", a case can be made that there is a presupposition to the question 
-- namely that the example actually does belong in the category.  We do not normally 
ask "how typical is Sydney as an American City" or "how good an example of US 
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Presidents is Joseph Stalin?"  The problem here began with Rosch and Mervis (1975) 
who included non-members of categories in their typicality rating lists.  The 
application of typicality ratings to non-members has continued in the literature (e.g. 
from McCloskey & Glucksberg 1978, through to Kalish 1995), although it can be 
argued that one is distorting the meaning of typicality by asking the question this way 
(Hampton & Gardiner, 1983, provided subjects with a “does not belong” response on 
the typicality rating scale, while Hampton, 1988, adopted a two stage decision in 
which typicality was asked as a supplementary question once subjects had given a 
positive categorization).  At the least it may be argued that there is an ambiguity to 
the judgment, as between rating the relative typicality of members within a category, 
and rating the typicality of just anything in a category.   
 If typicality were to apply just to category members (as seems the most natural 
interpretation of the task), then it would involve attribute weights that would differ 
from those appropriate to categorization per se.  This is because the weight of an 
attribute will depend on its diagnosticity for the task in hand (Tversky, 1977).  
Suppose that the weight of an attribute were determined statistically by computing the 
correlation of each attribute with the sum of the remaining attributes across a range of 
items, as in an item-total correlation for assessing reliability of items in psychometric 
tests.   The calculated weight will vary as a function of the range of items considered.  
If only potential category members are included (that is the range from typical 
category members down to borderline members), then the feature weights will 
correspond to those that determine typicality.  If on the other hand the full range of 
items is considered, including related non-members and totally unrelated items, the 
relative weight of features will be optimised for determining categorization.   
 What effect will these two sets of weights have on ratings?  The typicality 
weights will highlight attributes that best differentiate most typical from least typical 
category members.  What do typical cars, horses, or sports have that atypical ones do 
not?  The answer is the "incidental" trappings of the most common and familiar 
examples.  Typical cars have four wheels, atypical may have 3 or 6.  Typical horses 
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are brown or black, atypical may be piebald or white.  Typical sports have teams, 
competition and a ball, atypical ones may involve individuals pitting themselves 
against the elements.  What will not get high weights are those attributes which are 
more "defining", in that they are true of most category members, and untrue of many 
non-members.  Being able to carry people around determines membership in the car 
category, but is relatively unimportant in determining typicality.  Having a horse for a 
mother is important for being a horse, but is not important for being a typical one.   
 The argument then is that the two sets of attribute weights needed to preserve 
a basis in similarity for both typicality and categorization, in the face of evidence of 
non-monotonicity, can be derived from Tversky's (1977) Diagnosticity Principle.  
Weights are determined by the diagnosticity of the attributes for the task in question.  
Typicality carries with it the assumption of a range restricted to category members, 
while category membership clearly requires the full range of related and unrelated 
non-members also to be taken into account.  As a result, when typicality judgments 
are applied to non-members, the attributes which differentiate items within the 
category are applied to items outside the category.  Consider how one might answer 
the question "How typical is Sydney as a US city?".  If the question is to be answered 
sensibly, one may interpret it as asking "How similar is Sydney to typical US cities?".  
This question will then automatically produce a judgment based on what 
differentiates typical from atypical US cities, and which ignores that which 
differentiates US cities from others -- namely their location within the USA. 
 This argument is (for the moment) entirely speculative, and needs to be 
supported by empirical evidence if it is to help in shedding light on the processes 
involved in typicality and categorization judgments.  Little is as yet known about the 
stability of either type of judgment in the face of changing discourse contexts. 
 In conclusion, it has been argued that a critical difference between similarity- 
and rule-based accounts of categorization lies in their expectations that categorization 
probability and typicality will always vary in step with each other.  Rips (1989) 
offered evidence of a number of unusual cases in which a dissociation between the 
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two measures can be observed.  The approach adopted here has been to look not at 
artificially created test cases, but at a data set in which borderline cases in 17 different 
natural categories were assessed on both measures.  Further experimentation then 
examined cases of non-monotonicity and found that they could be attributed to 
several interesting factors.  Among these were some relating to typicality judgments -
- such as unfamiliarity and non-categorial semantic associations -- and others relating 
to categorization such as the effect of overlapping or contrasting categories.  There 
was also evidence for a difference in emphasis between typicality and categorization, 
with the former giving more weight to surface similarity, and the latter more weight 
to "technical" similarity.  Whether this effect is to be accounted for by a sophisticated 
similarity model, or by an equally sophisticated rule-based model, is perhaps of less 
immediate interest than the pursuit of the question of just how and why these effects 
do occur.  A speculative account based on pragmatics of the two tasks was offered as 
an example of one way in which this interesting question may be pursued. 
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Appendix 
Insert Figures 3 to 6 here 
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Reference Notes 
Note 1:   Hampton, J.A. (1996)  Non-monotonicity between categorization and 
typicality in transformed items:  an analysis of data from Kalish (1995). 
Note 2:   Hampton, J.A. (1996)  The relation between categorization and typicality: 
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1.  It should be understood that the concepts of Fish and Bird described in this way 
are  the mental representations of these categories possessed by the average person, 
and are not the same as the corresponding biologically defined concepts.  
2.  Well defined concepts such as rectangle or prime number would, of course, be 
outside the scope of the theory, since the necessity of their defining properties is a 
matter of analytic stipulation or deductive inference, rather than an empirical 
generality based on observation. 
3.  Lakoff (1987) points out that motherhood itself may be a prototype concept.  
Mothers normally satisfy multiple criteria - donors of genetic material, conception, 
pregnancy, birth, nursing and rearing.  Where these multiple criteria can be separated, 
then it is possible to argue that motherhood becomes a matter of degree, depending on 
how many of the criteria are satisfied, and how important they are to the concept. 
4.  Keil (1989) found that even relatively young children can appreciate the rule that 
parenting determines the species of the offspring.  Hampton’s (1995a) data suggest 
that although people understand this general rule, they may not be fully confident in 
applying it, when faced with contradictory evidence.  Subjects in the experiment may 
have believed it to be possible that a special diet could in fact change the physical 
nature of a creature or plant in such a way as to change its categorisation.  
Alternatively they may not have been using their concept of “species” in determining 
whether it is appropriate to label an organism as a zebra or an orange. 
5.  These are my examples. 
6.  This is to ignore for the present the additional important role of historical origin in 
determining whether a coin is a true coin as opposed to a fake.  Only a few of Rips' 
examples were of this type. 
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7.  My ability to criticise Rips' study is largely owing to his providing me with copies 
of his experimental booklets -- a generous gesture which I gratefully acknowledge. 
8.  Note that exemplar models use extensional representation of category members, 
and would predict the categorization performance here, but not the similarity 
judgments. 
9.  The analysis involves data summed over subjects, and so necessarily confounds 
individual subject differences with within-subject variance.  It would of course be 
hard to do the analysis in any other way, given that the assessment of probability 
requires repeated sampling of a binary judgment.  McCloskey and Glucksberg did 
however show that within-subject inconsistency in categorization across an interval of 
a few weeks was highly correlated with overall fuzziness as reflected in 
categorization probability for the group as a whole.  There is therefore a reasonable 
basis for assuming that analyzing the structure of categories based on group data will 
give a representative account of individual's conceptual representations and thought 
processes. 
10.  In a later analysis the 324 borderline items were “refined” by removing a further 
20 which had more than 85% “clear” categorization responses in the following 
experiment.  Correlation with categorization increased from .85 to .88.  
11.  Alternatively, McCloskey & Glucksberg’s use of a blocked presentation for 
typicality ratings may have drawn less attention to alternative categories than did the 
random presentation of different category-item pairs used for the categorization 
group. 
12.  Examples used for instructions had to employ words and categories not used in 
the norms - hence the choice of mammal as a category.  The example of kangaroos 
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was perhaps unfortunate, as the author later discovered that marsupials are in 
biological classification a subclass of mammals, thus rendering the example 
counterfactual for those participants with a detailed knowledge of biological 
classification.  No participants referred to this problem however. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1.  Scatterplot of the raw data relating probability of a positive categorization 
(P) to mean item typicality. 
Figure 2.  Scatterplot of observed probability of a positive categorization P against 
predicted values based on corrected typicality scores, together with 95% confidence 
intervals. 
Figure 3.  Scatterplot of probability of a positive categorization P versus mean item 
typicality for the category Bird. 
Figure 4.  Scatterplot of probability of a positive categorization P versus mean item 
typicality for the category Disease 
Figure 5.  Scatterplot of probability of a positive categorization P versus mean item 
typicality for the category Fish 
Figure 6.  Scatterplot of probability of a positive categorization P versus mean item 
typicality for the category Sport
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Table 1 
Cases with P Greater than or Less than Expected from their Typicality 
 
CATEGORY P GREATER THAN 
EXPECTED 
P LESS THAN 
EXPECTED 
Animals Sea Anemone, Hydra, Cocoon, Egg 
     Euglena, Sponge, Yeast  
Clothing - Cuff links, Bracelet 
Disease Schizophrenia, Depression, Heart attack, Fever 
     Neurosis  
Fish Lamprey Whale, Porpoise, Seal 
Fruit Tomato,  Olive Orange juice 
Furniture - Sewing machine, Stove, 
      Refrigerator 
Kitchen Utensil - Stove 
Natural Earth Formation Sinkhole Forest 
Precious Stone - Industrial Diamond 
Science Linguistics Nursing, Geometry 
Ship Sampan Sailboat 
Vegetable Sauerkraut - 
Weather phenomenon Waterspout Autumn 
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Table 2 
Number of Items Receiving At Least One Response to Either of Unfamiliarity 
Questions, the Mean Percentage of Responses per Item for Each of the Four 
Categorization Judgments, and the Mean Number of Items with at least 10% 
responses to the Associated Part or Property, and Contrast Category Questions.   











Animal 3 47 13 10 30 3 6 
Bird 7 71 3 5 21 2 0 
Clothing 0 22 12 16 51 11 2 
Disease 2 38 10 14 38 8 4 
Fish 3 23 9 19 50 0 9 
Fruit 2 44 8 6 42 2 3 
Furniture 0 25 11 11 54 9 2 
Insect 4 59 2 9 31 3 0 
Kitchen Utensil 0 43 10 10 36 13 4 
Nat. Earth Form. 4 74 12 3 12 3 0 
Precious Stone 11 50 6 13 31 1 1 
Science 1 61 15 7 17 8 5 
Ship 8 51 7 14 27 5 1 
Sport 5 63 16 8 13 0 11 
Vegetable 3 58 6 8 28 3 4 
Vehicle 1 41 25 5 29 4 6 
Weather Phen 3 51 7 8 34 2 3 
      MEAN 3.4 48 10 10 32 4.5 3.6 
Note: Nat. Earth Form. = Natural Earth Formation, Weather Phen. = Weather 
Phenomenon. 
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Table 3 
Regression statistics for predicting z transformed Categorization probability zp 
 
Variable B Beta t p 
TYPICALITY .459 .866 35.1 .001
UNFAMILIAR .064 .110 4.4 .001
ONLY TECHNICAL .756 .090 3.5 .001
TECH NOT -.469 -.053 -2.1 .04
PART/PROP -.646 -.064 -2.47 .02
CONTRAST - - - Not Sig.
(Constant) -2.30   
 
Note: B = Regression coefficient, Beta = Standardized regression coefficient. 
         Not Sig. = not significant at .05 level. 
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Table 4 
Significant Predictors in Regression Equations Predicting Residual Categorization 
Probability for Each of Five Groups of Categories. 
 
 Positive Predictors Negative Predictors 
Group Unfam Only Tech Tech Not Part/prop Contrast 
Biological:      
Artifact      
Natural kind      
Food      
Other      
 
Note: Unfam = Unfamiliarity, Only Tech = Only technically a member, Tech Not = 
Technically not a member, Par/Prop = An associated part or property, Contrast = 
Better member of a contrasting category. 
 
 
